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ABSTRACT: 
 
This paper offers a contract-based theory to explain the determination of standard hours, 
overtime hours and overtime premium pay.  We expand on the wage contract literature 
that emphasises the role of firm-specific human capital and that explores problems of 
contract efficiency in the face of information asymmetries between the firm and the 
worker.  We first explore a simple wage-hours contract without overtime and show that 
incorporating hours into the contract may itself produce efficiency gains. We then show 
how the introduction of overtime hours, remunerated at premium rates, can further 
improve contract efficiency.  Our modelling outcomes in respect of the relationship 
between the overtime premium and the standard wage rate relate closely to earlier 
developments in hedonic wage theory.  Throughout, we emphasise the intuitive reasoning 
behind the theory and we also supply relevant empirical evidence. Mathematical 
derivations are provided in an appendix. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
 
Models based on agency (Lazear, 1981) and firm-specific human capital (Kahn 
and Lang, 1992) recognise that efficient long-term contracts must set hours as well as 
wages. Empirically, it is well recognised that unions bargain over both hourly wage rates 
and the length of working hours (Pencavel, 1991).  The contract literature has stopped 
short, however, of providing explanations of why many firms employ overtime hours for 
which they pay premium rates.  Yet overtime working is an important aspect of total 
working hours determination.  In the U.K., and based on the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS), an annual average of one-third of male employees worked paid overtime 
between 1991 and 2005.  Moreover, since this economy experiences virtually no 
exogenous rules and regulations governing the use of overtime hours, these proportions 
suggest that there may be considerable advantages to the firm and its workforce in 
adopting such a working time arrangement. But why is it so popular?  There are 
surprisingly few theories that attempt to provide economic explanations for this working 
time arrangement.1   
Our explanation of why some firms make use of paid overtime and reward 
overtime hours at premium rates is embedded in wage-hours contract theory.  That is, we 
concentrate on wages and hours setting based on agreement between employer and 
employee.  Undoubtedly, the British economy offers one of the best examples of a labour 
market in which paid overtime is subject largely to contractual agreement.  As stated by 
Income Data Services (IDS, 1997), it is generally the case that “the number of hours 
                                 
1 Hart (2004, Chapter 5) offers a summary of existing explanations. 
 2
(including overtime) that an employee can be expected to work is a matter to be agreed 
between employer and employee. The terms relating to working hours should be set out 
in full in the employee’s written statement of terms and conditions of employment which 
must be supplied under the…(Employment Rights Act)”.2  Interestingly, although 
overtime is overwhelmingly paid for at wage rates in excess of standard, or basic, hourly 
rates, there is no legal requirement in Britain that premium rates should apply. 
In stark contrast to Britain’s laissez-faire attitude to paid overtime, the United 
States government imposes strict overtime controls on most workers.  The Fair Labor 
Standards Act sets standard weekly hours at 40 beyond which marginal hours have to be 
remunerated at a minimum rate of one-and-a-half times the standard hourly rate.  
However, evidence provided by Trejo (1993) suggests that 20 per cent of overtime hours 
is paid at a premium above standard rates before the weekly 40 hour-limit is reached.  
This points to the likelihood that, irrespective of outside rules and regulations, bargaining 
parties in some U.S. firms perceive internal advantages in employing weekly overtime 
hours that are paid for at premium rates.  
Our theory builds out from the two-period wage contract models in which the firm 
and its workers undertake specific human capital in period 1 and then share the surplus 
during their working relationship in period 2.   Management and workers are assumed to 
be asymmetrically informed about internal and external values of workers’ productivities.  
Due to high transaction costs of communicating and verifying privately-held information 
                                 
2 Actually, the contractual terms may also be implied.  “Contractual terms relating to 
overtime can be express – i.e. written into the contract of employment – or implied.  A 
term will only usually be implied to permit a change in working hours where it is 
necessary to give business efficacy or where it can be ascertained through custom in the 
particular industry or past practice between the parties” (IDS, 1997).  
 3
contracts are agreed at the start of the working relationship with subsequent re-
negotiation precluded. Modellers have concentrated on questions of contract efficiency, 
and means of improving efficiency, given the strictures of a priori bargaining.  
Essentially, the problem is one of minimizing sub-optimal separations (i.e. quits and 
layoffs).3  Our contribution is to extend these models to include working time.  Even in 
the absence of overtime working we show that incorporating hours into bargaining 
agreements helps potentially to improve efficiency. In other words, even simple hours 
extensions provide insights as to the potential importance of studying wage-hours 
contracts.  We go on to show how further efficiency gains can be achieved if overtime 
working is introduced into the total hours arrangements.  
Theoretical outcomes are considered against the background of a number of 
empirical findings that are outlined in section 2.  Our approach to the theory itself is to 
attempt to bring out the underlying intuition behind developments, with formal 
derivations confined to an appendix.  Section 3 compares and contrasts the theory of 
single wage contracts and simple wage-hours contracts.  Section 4 provides the model 
extensions that embrace overtime work and pay.   Section 5 compares the practice of 
using overtime payments rather than bonuses as a means of improving contract 
efficiency.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
                                 
3 Hashimoto (1981) and Carmichael (1983) are among the best known examples, and the 
ones that are most influential to the developments here. See Malcomson (1999) for an 
excellent review of this and related work. 
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2. Empirical Background 
With an emphasis on the British labour market, we answer seven empirical 
questions regarding the practice of overtime working.  At later stages, our answers are 
linked to theoretical findings.  
 (a) Who works paid overtime? 
The incidence of paid overtime is far higher among blue collar compared to white 
collar workers.  For example, Hart (2004) shows that within the British male workforce 
in 2001, 7.5% of managers and 13.1% of professionals worked paid overtime4 in contrast 
to 45.8% of plant and machine operatives. Respective figures for females are 9.1% and 
13.1% compared with 27.7%.  From the British company case studies reported in IDS 
(1997) we know that almost all manual workers are eligible for paid overtime while most 
companies stop paying for overtime among non-manual staff when they reach specified 
salary levels and grades. 
 
(b) What proportions of eligible workers work overtime? 
For purposes of convenience and simplification, most theoretical models of 
overtime working have assumed that within overtime firms all employees – usually 
represented as a homogeneous workforce - work overtime.  Based on proportions of 
British employees within a given occupation who work paid and unpaid overtime, Table 
                                 
4 In the statistical survey used below – i.e. the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 
between 1991 and 2005 – we make the distinction between all male workers and all 
workers excluding managers, professionals and associate professions.  While 33% of all 
male workers are found to work paid overtime during this period, this rises to 43% when 
managers, professionals and associate professionals are excluded.  In fact, only 13% of 
the latter group work paid overtime. 
 5
1 shows that, in reality, this is generally not the case. Where overtime is worked, there is 
typically less than complete overtime participation in a given occupation.  There are 
undoubtedly many reasons for this, but the observation at least points to the desirability 
of deriving modelling outcomes that are consistent with this observed partial incidence. 
 
(c) How high are overtime premiums? 
Internationally, premiums paid for overtime hours in excess of standard hours 
represent substantial incremental increases in basic hourly rates of pay.  Of the 27 
countries covered by the OECD (1998), one-half reported premiums of 50% or more5. In 
many countries, high premiums result from statutory intervention. The United States with 
a minimum mandatory premium of 50% provides the best known example.  But even in 
Britain where no legislation applies we know from the company case studies of IDS 
(1997) that a 50% premium occurs with the greatest frequency. Hart (2004) shows that 
overtime premiums vary between 30% and 40% when averaged over all British overtime 
workers.  .   
(d)  To what extent is overtime a requirement of the job? 
To what extent is there a permanent or systematic recourse to the use of overtime 
as opposed to reasons involving temporary contingencies like rush orders, cover for 
illness and labour shortages?  Hart (2004) presents British evidence – based on the 
Workplace Employees Relations Survey (WERS) – that almost one-quarter of employees 
who report that they work overtime claim that it a requirement of their job.  This points to 
the likelihood that many firms integrate overtime schedules as a permanent component of 
                                 
5 That is 50% of the standard hourly wage rate so that overtime is rewarded at ‘time-and-
a-half’ the standard rate. 
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their working time requirements.  Other WERS responses, cross-tabulated the workers 
who report that overtime is a job requirement, make it clear that individuals are generally 
favourably disposed towards their jobs and associated work experiences. 
 
(e)  Is there a relationship between paid overtime and job tenure? 
We develop wage-hours contracts that emphasise the role of specific human 
capital investment.  A useful empirical backdrop is to establish the connection between 
the probability of undertaking paid overtime and the two human capital-related Mincer 
variables, job tenure and work experience.  Based on the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) for the years 1991 to 2005, we estimate a probit equation in which the dependent 
variable takes the value of 1 if an individual worked paid overtime and 0 otherwise.  
Explanatory variables include quadratics in job tenure (i.e. length of stay in the current 
job) and work experience (length of labour market experience since completing full-time 
education, including length of stay in the current job) as well as individual and time fixed 
effects.  Other control variables are described in Table 2 together with estimated 
coefficients.  Estimation is carried out both excluding and including individual fixed 
effects.  We find that the probability of paid overtime rises in job tenure and declines in 
work experience.  The job tenure result is significant at 5% in the probit excluding 
individual fixed effects and slightly weaker in the fuller specification.  We note, however, 
that tenure coefficients are virtually unaltered when individual fixed effects are controlled 
for.  We carried out the same regression excluding managers, professionals and associate 
professionals, because this group work little paid overtime (see footnote 4), but this made 
no difference to the results. 
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(f)  What is the association between working paid overtime and job separation? 
Job separations (quits and layoffs) feature prominently in later developments. 
What is the relationship between separations and overtime working?  More specifically, if 
an individual works paid overtime in a given period does this affect the probability of a 
job move in the subsequent period?  Again using the BHPS for 1991 to 2005, we estimate 
a probit equation in which the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if an individual 
changed job in the current year and 0 otherwise.6  Explanatory variables include a binary 
variable indicating whether the individual worked paid overtime in the previous year, 
with the remaining variables included matching those of the job tenure regression.7  
Results are presented in Table 3.  For all workers, the estimated coefficient on working 
paid overtime in the previous year is negative but statistically insignificant.  When 
managers and professional workers are excluded this variable displays a significant 
negative association.  At least in respect of non-managers and non-professionals, working 
paid overtime reduces the probability of subsequent job move. 
 
(g) What is the relationship between the basic wage rate and the overtime premium? 
Based on the British New Earnings Survey, Bell and Hart (2003) and Hart (2004) 
show that there is a clear negative relationship between basic hourly wage rates (i.e. 
excluding overtime) and hourly premium rates for overtime hours.  It turns out that this 
relationship comprises an essential aspect of our theoretical predictions. 
 
                                 
6 A job move in BHPS refers to moves both within and between firms. 
7 Except tenure which is zero at the point of job change. 
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3. Wage and Wage-Hours Contracts 
Our discussion in this and the following two sections attempts to minimise 
technical detail and maximise intuitive explanation.  At various stages we link 
developments to a more formal exposition contained in the appendix. 
In this section and throughout we discuss wage and wage-hours contracts within a 
two period framework. Following Carmichael (1983), our wage-hours models 
differentiate between an initial period in which both work and specific training are 
undertaken and a post-investment period where the investment affects productivity. The 
analysis is conducted in terms of the marginal worker who initially receives spot market 
wage earnings in a perfectly competitive labour market.  Thus, prior to specific training 
in the initial period, the particular wage-hours combination available to the worker is 
determined by the market.  The training endows the worker with job-specific skills and so 
in the second period he is differentiated from other workers in the spot market. The 
generation of a surplus in the training period allows the parties to set a wage-hours 
combination in the second period that differs from the market-equivalents.   
The common denominators of each and every model – taken as given as we move 
from model to model – are as follows.  In period 1, the (marginal) worker receives 
specific training. In period 2 the worker is fully trained and no further training takes 
place. Retirement occurs at the end of period 2. First and second period wage rates are 
denoted respectively by w1 and w2, with the subscripts 1 and 2 carrying the same meaning 
on all variables.  The value of the alternative wage (or the outside opportunity) is wa and 
the value of marginal product is VMP.  Weekly hours in the firm are denoted by h and in 
alternative employment by ha.   
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(a)  Wage contracts8 
We start with brief resumes of three seminal contributions in the wage literature, 
concentrating on aspects that are most important to our subsequent working time 
extensions.  
Becker (1962) argues that the firm and its workers share the returns and costs (the 
surplus) associated with specific training.  Sharing consists of the firm paying for part of 
the training in period 1 and receiving a return in period 2 through paying w2 < VMP2.   
The second-period return to the worker is realised through w2 > wa. The inequalities 
VMP2 > w2 > wa discourage the firm from laying off trained workers and encourage 
workers to participate in period 1 training.    
Hashimoto (1981) investigates Becker’s sharing arrangements in more depth. He 
develops the theme that sharing is strongly conditioned by the transaction costs of 
verifying and communicating information with respect to VMP and wa (see also 
Hashimoto and Yu, 1980).  The critical problem is that the parties may not be equally 
knowledgeable about the productivities underlying these two variables, the values of 
which are not revealed until the start of period 2.  Hashimoto assumes that the firm 
observes VMP and the worker wa.  High transaction costs preclude the exchange of 
information in period 2.  Consequently, the two sides agree to set w1 and w2 ex ante (i.e. 
before training begins). Those workers who subsequently find that wa > w2 quit their jobs 
while the firm lays off workers for whom it turns out that w2 > VMP2.  Workers who 
remain receive w2 ≤ VMP2. The key point is that this can lead to inefficient separations. 
Why?  A separation would occur under a first best contract iff wa > VMP2.  So, the actual 
                                 
8 See also Hutchens (1989).  
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quit/layoff decisions are likely to involve separations taking place when the surplus is 
positive.   
An inefficient quit would occur if  
(1)      VMP2 > wa > w2.  
The worker quits because of a better outside opportunity but the firm wants the worker to 
remain because it makes a surplus. But since knowledge of  wa and VMP is 
asymmetrically held and since the transaction costs of communication and verification 
are prohibitively high, there is no solution that involves the firm, ex post, giving up part 
of its gain to the worker by enough to avoid the separation.  
An inefficient layoff would occur if 
(2)        w2 > VMP2 > wa. 
Again, the surplus is positive, but this time solely in favour of the worker.  The inability 
to re-negotiate the contract because of problems of credible information exchange leads 
to an inefficient layoff. 
Carmichael (1983) suggests a work and pay arrangement that improves on the 
efficiency of the Hashimoto model.9  He introduces a seniority system for period 2 
consisting of type 1 jobs and a fixed number of more senior type 2 jobs. Type 1 and type 
2 workers are trained to the same standard in period 1 and are equally productive. Type 1 
                                 
9 Carmichael makes the more realistic assumption that both parties are equally 
knowledgeable about wa but that only the worker knows the degree of job satisfaction 
derived from the current job.  For continuity of exposition, and because it makes no 
substantive difference to outcomes, we stick to Hashimoto’s informational assumptions in 
the main text.  In the appendix, we link our model more directly to that of Carmichael 
(1983) and so we use the idea of workers’ private information on job satisfaction. Again, 
we emphasise that this makes no difference to the key findings. 
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jobs are remunerated at w2 and type 2 at w2 + S where S is a seniority bonus.  Promotion 
to type 2 jobs is related to length of tenure.  A newly trained worker is assigned to a type 
1 job.  As tenure lengthens, the worker eventually reaches the head of the promotion 
queue of type 1 employees, achieving type 2 status when the next vacancy occurs. The 
precise timing of promotion is uncertain, occurring sometime around the middle of the 
second period. In respect of contract efficiency, the critical consequence of this automatic 
promotion rule is that a layoff can only save the firm w2.  This outcome means that S 
provides an additional instrument to w2 with which to achieve contract efficiency.  As 
pointed out by Hutchens (1989), for S to add value, it must have a different effect on 
separations from that of w2.   Carmichael shows that an increase in w2 reduces quits and 
raises layoffs while an increase in S reduces quits (the incentive to wait to receive a wage 
greater than VMP2) but does not affect layoffs (the firm can only save w2 if a worker is 
laid off.) 
Carmichael shows that   
(3)      w2 + S > VMP2 > w2,  
that is at least some of the type 2 workers are paid above their marginal products and type 
1 workers below their marginal products.   What accounts for these inequalities?  Under 
the bonus scheme, both parties have an incentive to agree w2 such that VMP2 > w2 > wa, 
thereby reducing the inefficient layoffs as represented by inequality (2) in the Hashimoto 
model.  They would agree to this because (i) this improves the incentive for them to stay 
together and (ii) a relatively low wage can be compensated by a high bonus. This 
accounts for the second inequality in (3), but what accounts for the first, i.e. a level of 
seniority pay above marginal product? Suppose there are N2 workers in period 2 of which 
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NB receive a bonus. As long as the firm has a positive surplus, that is N2.VMP2 > (w2 + 
S).NB +w2.(N2 – NB), high remuneration due to seniority (w2 + S), even above VMP2, can 
reduce inefficient quits as represented by inequality (1) in the Hashimoto model.  This is 
due to the fact that the expected ex ante wage income of a marginal worker is given by ω 
= w2 + S.NB/N2.  A high S would make it more likely that ω > wa, which offsets the low 
w2. 
Under his seniority bonus scheme, Carmichael’s compensating rule (3) reduces 
both the inefficient quit represented by (1) and the inefficient layoff in (2) highlighted by 
Hashimoto in his model.  
 
(b) Wage-hours contracts 
Concentrating on the framework of Carmichael (1983), we now introduce 
working hours into the picture and show that hours matter in these human capital 
models.10 Early pointers are provided in the wage-hours labour demand literature 
(Brechling, 1965; Ehrenberg, 1971). In labour demand models, a rise in initial training 
investment induces the firm to increase working hours since investment amortisation is 
improved both by longer tenure among trained workers and more intensive labour input 
for given tenure.  
The inclusion of working time necessarily alters the representation of the worker’s 
pay and marginal product.  Pay is now expressed in terms of weekly earnings net of the 
disutility of providing weekly hours; that is y = w.h – d(h).  As for marginal product, we  
recognise that it may be functionally related to the length of weekly hours.  In fact, we 
                                 
10 Formal developments are given in appendix.   
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would expect that the first derivative of VMP(h) with respect to hours to be VMP′(h)≤ 0.  
Typically, the working time literature assumes VMP is declining in hours due to such 
influences as fatigue and boredom.  However, VMP that is independent of hours changes 
may not be uncommon in work environments where weekly hours are relatively short or 
where working time is systematically punctuated by rest periods or where performance 
monitoring is prevalent. For simplicity, and without losing the essential features of our 
hours’ modelling extensions, we focus on hours-invariant VMP in the main text.  In the 
appendix, we indicate how the results are modified when hours-related VMP is 
considered.11 
Second-period weekly earnings are given by w2.h2.12 Suppose initially that weekly 
hours are exogenously determined.  For example, the firm might adopt the customarily 
accepted normal hours of the industry to which it belongs.  Workers quit if wa.ha - d(ha) > 
w2.h2 - d(h2). The firm lays off workers if w2.h2 > VMP2.h2.  Adopting the same private 
information assumptions as before, inefficient separations are likely to occur because the 
first-best separation rule is given by wa.ha - d(ha) > VMP2.h2 - d(h2).  In line with the 
arguments surrounding inequality (1), an inefficient quit would occur if  
(4)    VMP2.h2 - d(h2) > wa.ha - d(ha) > w2.h2 - d(h2) 
                                 
11 In appendix section (i) – (iv), we fully develop the case where hourly productivity 
VMP is assumed to be (working) hours-invariant. In appendix section (v), we explain 
why the introduction of hours-related VMP does not qualitatively change the conclusions 
reached in the simpler set-up.      
12 Assumption concerning first-period hours, marginal product and training cost are 
outlined in appendix section (i). 
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or a worker would quit the firm despite a positive surplus.  In line with inequality (2), an 
inefficient layoff would occur if  
(5) w2.h2 - d(h2) > VMP2.h2 - d(h2) > wa.ha - d(ha).   
or the firm would fire the worker despite a positive surplus.  
What if the parties were to move away from using exogenously determined hours? 
As long as the worker’s return y2 = w2.h2 - d(h2) increases with h2 [i.e. w2 > d′(h2)], then 
longer hours increase the return and hence induce a greater incentive for the worker to 
stay. At the margin, assuming w2 > d′(h2), workers for whom  
 
(6)     wa.ha - d(ha) > w2.h2 - d(h2)  
 
held before the increase in h2 would now be induced to stay by a reversal of this 
inequality.  As for the firm, increasing h2 involves a cost (weekly earnings are increased) 
and a gain (weekly marginal product is increased).  As long as VMP2.h2 ≥ w2.h2 the firm 
has no incentive to fire. In fact, under the assumption that VMP is hours-invariant, i.e., 
VMP′(h2)≡ 0 , a change in h2 has no effect on layoffs.13 
What is the stopping rule for the h2 increase?  It is undertaken until y2 = w2.h2 - 
d(h2) is maximized for the marginal worker subject to the constraint that w2.h2 ≤ VMP2.h2. 
Let the optimal hours for this worker be denoted ho.  If hours are too long, or h2 > ho, this 
would reduce y2 = w2.h2 - d(h2) and we would go back to the inequality in (6) thereby 
inducing separation. 
                                 
13 See appendix section (v) for a relaxation of this assumption. 
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How does this wage-hours specification compare with Carmichael’s wage model 
incorporating a seniority bonus?  There is one similarity.  The hours variable provides a 
second potential instrument to help effect efficient separations. Conditional on w2.h2 ≤ 
VMP2.h2, it may act as an incentive for workers to stay with the firm without strongly 
affecting the firm’s own layoff decision.14  There are three differences between the hours 
and bonus mechanisms.  First, the hours instrument applies to all trained workers.  
Second and related, in the (w2, ho) hours contract, the cost of retaining a (marginal) 
worker in period two is exactly the same as the pay of a marginal worker.  These two 
costs are different in Carmichael's model.  Third, Carmichael’s automatic compensation 
rule shown by (3) effectively reduces both inefficient quits and layoffs.  But our simple 
wage-hours contract only reduces inefficient quits, it may well not reduce inefficient 
layoffs.  The second and third of these differences are important because they point to the 
possibility that there may be room for further efficiency improvements.  This is where the 
use of overtime hours becomes relevant. 
  
4.  Overtime hours and premium pay15 
Suppose that the parties are operating under the above (w2, ho) hours contract. 
This does not rule out the possibility that VMP2 > w2, in which case the firm would prefer 
longer hours h2 > ho. This possibility is precluded in the contract as it stands because 
hours in excess of ho would reduce y2, or 
  
                                 
14 If VMP2 is hours-invariant, the firm’s layoff decision is strictly unaffected and h2 
provides an especially effective instrument. 
15 See appendix section (iv) for formal developments. 
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(7)   w2.h2 - d(h2) < w2.ho - d(ho), for h2 > ho    
 
implying that the probability of quitting is increased thereby triggering more inefficient 
separations.   
One possibility of compensating the fall of  y2 for a rise in h2 beyond ho, is for the 
firm to offer overtime pay k.w2 for these marginal hours such that w2.ho + k.w2.(h2 - ho) - 
d(h2) > w2.ho - d(ho). Using inequality (7), this implies that the overtime premium k 
would be set such that 
  
(8)       1
).(
)()(
22
2 >−
−>
o
o
hhw
hdhd
k . 
 
The firm must pay an overtime premium k > 1 to compensate the worker for the disutility 
of ‘involuntary’ long hours. 
Should the firm pay all, equally productive, trained workers the same per-person 
overtime hours at a premium k2.w2 (k2 > 1) such that the gap h2 - ho is filled?  This is 
problematic because it would increase marginal pay and hence increase the probability of 
layoffs.  A superior outcome is suggested by Carmichael’s second period two-tier bonus 
system.  In terms of overtime, this translates into guaranteeing a fixed number of trained 
and longer tenured workers additional overtime hours at a premium rate.  A junior trained 
worker waits in a queue until his turn arrives to work the guaranteed overtime.  The 
firm’s marginal hourly cost k.w2 while the marginal hourly replacement cost is w2.  As in 
Carmichael, efficiency is gained because the cost of retaining a marginal worker differs 
from the pay of the marginal worker.   
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As with Carmichael’s bonus arrangement, is there an incentive for workers to 
want to work paid overtime?  In other words, does this overtime pay scheme also have an 
automatic compensating rule  
(9) k.w2 > VMP2 > w2 
that reduces both inefficient quits as in (4) and inefficient layoffs as in (5) that occur in 
the simple wage-hours contract?  The answer is yes. 
Both the firm and the worker have incentive to lower w2 to a level such that 
VMP2.h2 - d(h2) > w2.h2 - d(h2) > wa.ha - d(ha), in order to reduce an inefficient layoff 
under (5). The lower wage w2 is then automatically compensated by an overtime 
premium k > 1 when a senior worker quits or is fired. This explains the second inequality 
in (9).  Then why is the firm willing to pay a long-tenured workers an overtime premium 
k such that k.w2 > VMP2? This is because as long as the firm has a positive surplus, i.e.,  
    
             VMP2 [ N2.ho + NP (h2 - ho) ] > w2 [ N2.ho + k.NP (h2 - ho) ],  
where Np is the number of senior workers working overtime for premium pay, a high 
overtime pay k.w2, even above the VMP2, can reduce inefficient quits as represented by 
(4). This is due to the fact that the expected wage income, net of the expected disutility of 
hours, of a marginal worker is given by: 
y2  = (1-NP/N2)[w2.ho - d(ho)] + (NP/N2) [w2.ho +k.w2.(h2 - ho) - d(h2)] 
      = w2.ho + (NP/N2).k.w2.(h2-ho) - (1-NP/N2).d(ho) - (NP/N2).d(h2). 
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A high k.w2 would make it more likely that y2 > wa.ha - d(ha), which offsets a low w2. 
This explains the first inequality in (9).   
Figure 1 illustrates the overtime pay schematic resulting from these developments.  
It is consistent with the evidence produced in Section 2.  First, and generally, we expect 
firms that systematically and consistently make use of overtime to be most likely to be 
involved in this contractual arrangement because they are guaranteeing overtime to a 
fixed number of senior workers (i.e. workers with longer tenure).  We know from Section 
2 (d) that a significant proportion of workers indicate that overtime working is a job 
requirement.  Second, from Section 2 (a) and Table 1 we know that, where overtime is 
worked, it is typical that not all workers in a given occupation are overtime workers.16  
Third, since we argue that workers with longer tenure are more likely to work overtime, 
the model is consistent with the findings in Section 2 (e) and Table 2 that overtime 
working rises in job tenure.  Fourth, while of course not conclusive evidence, it would 
unsurprising if premiums that typically represent between a 30% and 50% mark-up of 
basic rates, as discussed in 2 (c), are found to be above marginal product. In fact, we 
provide another piece of evidence that is consistent with high returns to paid overtime. If 
paid overtime is rewarded at above marginal product then we would expect overtime 
workers would exhibit relatively low probabilities of leaving their current jobs. Results 
reported in Section 2 (f) and Table 3 provide some support for this expectation.   
As reported in Section 2 (g), U.K. empirical work has established a negative 
relationship between the basic hourly wage rate and the hourly overtime premium rate of 
                                 
16 Moreover, the fractions in Table 1 that do not work overtime are generally too large to 
be accounted for by workers in their early tenure who are undergoing training.   
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pay.  This is consistent with the compensating rule of our wage-hours contract.  We have 
established that, embedded in the contract solution [see (A23) in appendix], we have  
  
(10) 
∂
∂
w
k
2 0<            
or there is an inverse relationship between the contractual wage and the overtime 
premium. Lowering w2 increases profit to the firm but also increases the probability of  
the worker quitting. Hence the wage stopping rule is where the marginal profit to the firm 
equals to marginal loss of an extra unit reduction of w2.  Similarly, an increase of k 
reduces the profit to the firm but increases the probability of the worker staying, which in 
turn enhances the firm’s profit. Hence the premium stopping rule is where the marginal 
loss of the firm equals to marginal profit of an extra unit increase of k. 
This wage-premium trade-off is an especially important outcome since it links to 
a wider theoretical and empirical literature.  Based on the seminal paper of Lewis (1969), 
the theory of hedonic wages also establishes this negative wage-premium relationship.  
Essentially, the parties agree optimal compensation packages based the worker’s 
objective of finding earnings/hours combinations that maximise utility and the firm’s 
profit maximising motivation that establishes optimal workers/hours combinations.17  In 
an important policy application, Trejo (1991) shows that if an outside agent (i.e. the 
government) were to increase the size of k by mandate then the parties would simply 
agree to decrease w2 so as to leave their agreed compensation package intact.  Attempts to 
increase employment on the extensive margin by imposing more costly overtime on the 
                                 
17 The best source for theoretical developments is Kinoshita (1987). 
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intensive margin are essentially negated by such an automatic adjustment reaction.18  Our 
contract model provides an alternative theoretical approach that provides the same 
mechanism. 
 
5.  An Overtime Premium or a Bonus? 
The foregoing overtime premium arrangement has the same mechanism as the 
seniority bonus S of Carmichael. An increase in k reduces quits (the incentive to wait to 
receive a wage that is greater than w2) but – due to the delayed overtime eligibility 
assumption - does not affect layoffs. In fact the two schemes are mathematically 
equivalent.  For example, a firm may introduce a seniority bonus S, instead of k, to 
achieve the same objective. That is, a senior worker may receive a package of w2.h2 + S 
= w2.ho + k.w2.(h2-ho) as an equivalent contract (w2, h2, S), where h2>ho is specified in the 
contract and S is not explicitly linked to hours. However, at least for the class of workers 
who typically work overtime, the use of overtime premiums rather than bonuses to 
reward longer tenured workers has two very strong advantages.   
The first advantage relates to the type of worker who works paid overtime. As we 
have seen in Section 2 (a), paid overtime is typically related to blue-collar work.  Such 
workers often work alongside colleagues who possess the same or very close skills.19  
Even under a priori contractual agreements, paying a bonus for no extra effort to more 
senior workers who are equally trained may well be deemed by management to lead to 
                                 
18 Trejo (1991) presents U.S. evidence for such a reaction. See also Bell and Hart (2003) 
for U.K evidence.  
19 Of course, such blue-collar workers can also possess significant firm specific human 
and organisational capital that is not easily transferable to other work environments. 
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potentially serious shop floor industrial relations problems. Essentially, reward and effort 
are relatively more visible within blue collar work environments than in more 
management-related occupations.20  Where it is clear that higher pay is linked to more 
effort in the form of longer per-period hours then there will be a greater perception of 
fairness.  
The second advantage relates to the earlier human capital literature that includes 
hours as a choice variable.  The parties invest in specific human capital in period 1.  It is 
in their interest to maximise the returns to such investment in period 2.  The relevant 
extensive market action to this end involves encouraging longer tenure. The comparable 
intensive margin action involves encouraging longer per-period hours.  A delayed 
overtime payment system for senior trained workers provides a scheme that is 
transparently consistent with this latter objective.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Overtime working is an important consideration in labour market economics and 
macroeconomics because for many workers it represents the marginal cost of labour 
input.  There have been very few attempts to provide an economic rationale for the use of 
overtime hours and associated premium pay.  In fact, the assumption of ‘custom and 
practice’ is probably the most prevalent rationale.   Here, we offer explanations based on 
an important earlier wage contract literature that emphasises specific human capital and 
asymmetric information. Our wage-hours model allows for changes in labour inputs on 
                                 
20 Those engaged in managerial and/or professional occupations are likely to undertake more complex and 
multi-faceted job tasks that would tend to be individual-specific and less widely understood by work 
colleagues.  Bonus payments may therefore be a less contentious reward in respect of seniority. 
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the extensive (stock of workers) and intensive (working hours) margins. We show that it 
is in the interest of the firm and its workforce to increase both wages and hours once 
investments have been sunk.  Even without the use of overtime, we illustrate how jointly 
bargaining over the hours of trained workers can enhance contract efficiency.  If firms 
would prefer even longer hours in order to enhance the firm’s surplus, we show how an 
overtime premium schedule could optimally be brought into play.  It is in the parties’ 
joint interests to guarantee overtime work and premium pay to relatively senior trained 
workers.  We show that the optimal pay configuration is to remunerate the basic hours of 
trained workers at a rate below marginal product and their overtime pay at above 
marginal product. 
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Appendix: An extended Carmichael model with overtime pay 
We present modelling developments that lie behind the discussion in sections 2, 3 
and 4.  Essentially, we extend the contract model of Carmichael (1983) to incorporate 
working hours and overtime pay.  
(i)  Underlying framework  
The worker’s pre-entry endowment of general human capital is worth wa in the 
spot market and this is not augmented within the firm.  Specific training is undertaken at 
a fixed (i.e. hours-independent) weekly cost, C. In period 1, the worker has hourly 
productivity VMP1 = wa – C/h1, where h1 is first-period weekly hours. The expected 
value per unit of specific human capital is M so that specific training is expected to raise 
hourly productivity to E(VMP2) =wa + M, where VMP2 and M are both assumed to be 
hour-invariant for simplicity. We relax this restriction in section (v).   
The parties negotiate the contract at the beginning of period 1 and there is no 
subsequent renegotiation.  The contract contains an agreed value of investment return M: 
it may be simple to verify some of the elements that signal the level of productivity, such 
as the state of current and future orders for the firm’s product.  However, transaction 
costs of communicating and verifying information between the parties prevent agreement 
over the way in which random elements cause deviations from M.  Such costs are 
represented by a random variable η which has density function f(η) and E(η) = 0.  That 
is, the realised hourly productivity in period 2 is VMP2 = wa + M + η.  Due to lack of 
agreement over η, the firm responds unilaterally to the realised value of η at the end of 
period 1.  The worker assesses the degree of job satisfaction θ in the firm, relative to 
potential outside opportunities, at the end of period 1. Again, transaction costs prevent a 
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mutually agreed value of θ and only the worker responds to its realised value.  The 
density function of θ is q(θ) with E(θ) = 0.  It is assumed that Cov(η,θ) = 0. Ex post, 
information is private and cannot be exchanged and so separation decisions are made 
independently.   
The probability of a worker deciding to quit is 
 θθθ
θ
dqQQ )(=*)(=
*
-
∫
∞
     (A1) 
while the probability of the firm wanting to fire a worker is 
 dηf(ηF=F )=)(
*
-
* ∫
∞
η
η       (A2) 
where θ* is the level of job satisfaction that leaves the worker indifferent about leaving 
and η* is the level of productivity that leaves the firm indifferent over employing the 
worker. Without loss of generality, the discount rate is set to zero.   
The worker works h1 and h2 weekly hours in periods 1 and 2 respectively, with 
the corresponding disutilities represented by d(h1) and d(h2).  For simplicity, we assume 
that weekly hours in period 1 are fixed to h1=ha, where ha is alternative employment 
working hours. But the number of weekly hours in period 2 is a choice variable h2.   
The parties’ joint wealth consists of the returns arising from three mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive events, weighted by the probability of their occurrence.  The 
worker may be fired or not-fired at the end of the first period.  In the event of the worker 
not being fired, separation may occur due to a quit decision or the employment 
relationship may continue.  In all three outcomes the first period surplus consists of wage 
earnings net of training cost and work disutility (wa.ha - C - d(ha)).  If the worker is fired 
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or voluntarily quits, the second period surplus to the worker is given by the market value 
wa.ha - d(ha); in these instances, the firm itself cannot obtain second period surplus.  If the 
worker remains with the firm, second period surplus differs from the first period due 
enhanced productivity and job satisfaction as well as to the fact that second-period hours 
may differ from those in the first period.   
Formally, the expected joint wealth W is expressed:  
W = F.[wa.ha - C - d(ha) + wa.ha - d(ha)]         (the worker is fired)     
+ (1-F).Q.[wa.ha - C - d(ha) + wa.ha - d(ha)]     (the worker quits)  
+(1-F).(1-Q).{wa.ha-C- d(ha) +h2[wa +M +E(η|η>η*)+E(θ|θ>θ*)]- d(h2) } 
      (the worker stays).                           (A3) 
 
(ii) The first-best solution without the problem of asymmetric information 
Similar to Carmichael (1983), the first-best solution without the problem of 
asymmetric information may be derived by simply choosing a (θ*, η*, h2) triplet to 
maximize the joint wealth W in (3). This gives the following first-best solution (the 
details are available upon request). 
A worker quits if the job satisfaction θ is too low: 
 θ < θ* = - [ wa (h2 - ha)/h2 + M + E(η|η>η*) + d(ha)/h2 -d(h2)/h2] (A4) 
The firm fires a worker if the realised hourly productivity in period 2 is too low: 
 η < η* =- [ wa (h2 - ha)/h2 + M + E(θ|θ>θ*) + d(ha)/h2 -d(h2)/h2 ]  (A5) 
and the optimal working hours h2 in period 2 are determined by 
 d′(h2) = wa + M + E(η|η>η*) + E(θ|θ>θ*) (A6) 
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These conditions imply that the first-best solution can only be achieved if the 
party wishing to separate is made to internalise the entire expected losses from the 
separation. 
 
(iii) Asymmetric information and the second-best solution  
Now suppose that information concerning job satisfaction and productivity cannot 
be exchanged ex post. Then the firm and its workers will determine the separation rules 
of fire and quit unilaterally. The joint wealth W in (3) is maximised subject to the 
constraints of the two separation rules.  That is, the wage contract w2 is offered to ensure 
that the firm will fire the workers whenever productivity is too low  
  η < η* = -(wa + M - w2).       (A7) 
Equivalently, workers will quit whenever job satisfaction is too low; i.e. 
 θ < θ* = - w2 + [ wa.ha - d(ha) + d(h2) ]/h2 .     (A8)   
This indicates that there are only two - instead of three in Section (ii) - choice variables 
(w2, h2) to maximize the joint wealth. Therefore, the solution under asymmetric 
information is a second-best solution. (Full details of the solution are available upon 
request). 
 However, given w2, we find that the probability of a marginal worker quitting (Q) 
is negatively related to working hours in period 2 (h2), that is, 
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if the disutility is not too large; that is if the elasticity of disutility with respect to hours eh 
is less than unity, or 
 v
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We also find that the probability of firing (F) is independent of working hours in period 2 
(h2), i.e. 
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 This implies that longer hours would induce workers to stay as the wage income 
rises with the hours, but longer hours do not affect the probability of fire. Hence, longer 
hours may improve the efficiency of the second-best solution if the elasticity of disutility 
with respect to hours eh is less than unity. 
 
(iv) Overtime pay and contractual efficiency 
Suppose that the optimized period 2 working hours from Section (iii) above are 
given as ho. In this section, we ask the following question. If the firm pays a pre-
announced fixed-number of trained and longer tenured workers (Np) additional overtime 
hours at a premium rate k.w2 (with k>1) to induce them to work extra α hours on top of ho 
basic hours, will this further improve contract efficiency?  Under this arrangement, a 
junior trained worker waits in a queue until his turn arrives to work the guaranteed 
overtime.  The firm’s marginal hourly cost is k.w2 while the marginal hourly replacement 
cost is w2.  As in Carmichael (1983), efficiency may be gained because the cost of 
retaining a marginal worker differs from the pay of the marginal worker.   
Similar to the design of Carmichael (1983, p.254), in our overtime premium 
scheme, workers are promoted (or tenured) sometime in the middle of their second 
 vi
period. Therefore, at the beginning of the period 2, the ex ante expected joint wealth Wot 
between the firm and a worker becomes:  
Wot = F.[wa.ha - C - d(ha) + wa.ha - d(ha)]         (the worker is fired)     
+ (1-F).Q.[wa.ha - C - d(ha) + wa.ha - d(ha)]     (the worker quits)  
  +(1-F).(1-Q). {  wa.ha - C - d(ha)  
    +(ho+αρ)[wa +M +E(η|η>η*)+E(θ|θ>θ*)]- (1-ρ)d(ho) -ρd(ho+α) } 
      (the worker stays).                           (A10) 
where ρ=Np/N2 is the pre-announced fraction of longer-serving workers who work 
overtime over the total number of workers in period 2, α is the number of overtime hours. 
 If α = 0 and hence ρ = 0, then joint wealth Wot collapses to that in Section (iii). 
However, if α > 0 for long-serving workers, would that increase Wot and hence improve 
the efficiency of the contract? The answer is yes. This is due to the fact that the expected 
wage income, net of the expected disutility of hours, of a marginal worker in period 2 is 
given by: 
 y2 = w2.ho + (1 - ρ)[ w2 ho - d(ho)] + ρ [w2 ho + k w2 α - d(ho+α)]  (A11) 
A worker would quit if  
 θ <θ* ρα+
−=
o
aa
h
yhw 2 .        (A12) 
Hence, there is a negative relationship between the probability of quit (Q) and overtime 
hours (α:), that is 
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There is also a negative relationship between the probability of quit (Q) and proportion of 
overtime workers (ρ), that is 
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Both inequalities of (A13) and (A14) would hold if the elasticity of disutility with respect 
to hours eh is less than unity and overtime hours are not too long (the full details are 
available upon request). 
 The probability of quit (Q) is also negatively related to the overtime premium (k), 
that is 
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Taking inequalities (A13) to (A15) together, imply that a package consisting of an 
overtime premium (k>1) offered to a group of longer-serving workers (ρ>0) for overtime 
hours (α>0) would induce a marginal worker to stay. 
 On the other hand, the firing decision (A7) is unaffected by the overtime package 
since 0=∂
∂=∂
∂=∂
∂
k
FFF
ρα . This is due to the fact that there are a fixed number of ‘with 
overtime’ posts and automatic promotion from the ‘without overtime’ pool when there is 
a vacancy. Hence, a layoff can only save the firm w2ho under this system (this mechanism 
is similar to that in Carmichael (1983)). 
 Furthermore, substituting the fire-quit constraints (A7) and (A12) into the joint 
wealth Wot , we have: 
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where 
   =∂
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*θ
otW  - (1-F)q(θ*){ d(ha)+ho E(VMP2)+ρ α [E(VMP2) – k w2 ]} <0  (A19) 
   E(VMP2) = wa+M +E(η|η>η*). 
The inequality (A19) will hold if the overtime premium k is not too high. 
 Inequalities (A16) to (A18) together reveal that a scheme of overtime premium 
(k>1) offered to a group of longer-serving workers (ρ>0) for overtime hours (α>0) could 
indeed improve the contract efficiency. 
 Next we derive the automatic compensating rule for the overtime pay scheme. As 
long as firing is avoided, we have: 
  η ≥ η* = -(wa + M - w2). 
This implies 
 VMP2 = wa + M + η  ≥ w2.            (A20) 
Furthermore, 
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which implies that a low wage rate w2 would reduce the probability of fire. Therefore, it is 
more likely that the outcome VMP2 > w2 will be realised, which is the second inequality 
of the automatic compensating rule (9) in the main text. 
 The rational of the first inequality in (9) is due to the fact that both 0<∂
∂
k
Q  (A15) 
and 0>∂
∂
k
Wot  (A18). Hence high overtime premium pay k.w2, even above VMP2, would 
reduce the probability of quit and improve the efficiency of the contract. 
 Finally, substituting the fire-quit constraints (A7) and (A12) into the joint wealth 
Wot , we have: 
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 From (A18) and (A22), we have 
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This proves the inequality (10) in the main text. 
 
(v) The case of hours-variant VMP 
 x
Here we relax the assumption that the value of marginal product VMP is constant 
and invariant with respect to working hours. We show that this is an innocuous 
assumption that would not affect our conclusion qualitatively. 
Suppose that the hourly value of marginal product for a marginal worker in period 
2 is VMP2= VMP(h2), where h2 is working hours in period 2, and VMP′(h2)<0 due to such 
influences as fatigue and boredom. The total value of marginal product for a marginal 
worker in period 2 is given as ∫= 2
0
2 )()(
h
dhhVMPhTVMP , with TVMP′(h2)=VMP(h2)>0, 
and TVMP″(h2)= VMP′(h2) < 0. 
In our theoretical model we have VMP2 = wa+M+η. For simplicity, we maintain 
the assumption that both the value of the alternative wage wa and the random shock η are 
hours-invariant. Hence, an hours-variant VMP implies that the hourly specific human 
capital M after training for a marginal worker in period 2 is also hours-variant - i.e. M(h2) 
with M′(h2)<0. The total specific human capital TM after training for a marginal worker 
is given by  
∫= 2
0
2 )()(
h
dhhMhTM , with TM′(h2)=M(h2)>0, and TM″(h2)= M′(h2) < 0. 
The firm’s firing rule (A7) then changes to: 
 
2
2
2 0
1* ( ) .
h
aw M h dh wh
η η ⎡ ⎤< = − + −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫        (A24) 
One of the important implications of hours-variant VMP is that the firing rule is no longer 
independent of hours. In other words, working hours now have an influence on the firm’s 
firing decision.  
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 However, the relationship between the probability of fire (F) and working hours 
in period 2 is negative: 
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if the effect of fatigue is not too large, i.e., the elasticity of total specific human capital 
(TM) with respect to hours eTM,h is greater than unity: 
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This implies that the hours-variant VMP simply introduces an additional constraint on 
working hours.  Hours should not be excessively long so as to reduce VMP substantially 
due to the fatigue. Subject to this constraint eTM,h>1,  longer working hours would reduce 
the probability of firing and therefore could still improve the contract efficiency.   
 On the other hand, hours-variant VMP also affects the inequality (A19). If the 
expected VMP2 is lowered due to fatigue, then it will place an additional constraint on the 
size of the overtime premium k. If this constraint is fulfilled, then an overtime premium 
could still improve the contract efficiency. 
 To conclude, an hours-variant VMP imposes additional constraints on the length 
of working hours and the magnitude of the overtime premium. If these constraints are 
satisfied, hours-variant VMP would not change the main results of our model. 
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Table 1  Proportions of British employees who regularly work overtime or hours in 
excess of normal working hours, by largest occupational group within the establishment 
(paid and unpaid overtime hours) 
 Weighted % (based on 2295 establishments) 
1. All (100%) 7.8 
2 Almost all (80-99%) 7.9 
3. Most (60-79%) 10.4 
4. Around half (40-59%) 15.2 
5 Some (20-39%) 20.4 
6. Just a few (1-19%) 22.5 
7. None (0%) 13.7 
8. Other*  2.0 
Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) (Management Survey), 2003. 
* Including refusal to give information and don’t know. 
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Table 2  Probability of working paid overtime: male workers (BHPS 1991-2005) 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Probit  
 
Probit  
(with individual fixed effects) 
 
TENURE 0.007* 
(0.003) 
 
0.007 
(0.005) 
 
(TENURE)2/100 0.003 
(0.01) 
 
0.009 
(0.022) 
 
EXPERIENCE -0.009* 
(0.002) 
 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
 
(EXPERIENCE)2/100 
 
 
-0.076 
(0.004) 
 
-0.026* 
(0.009) 
 
BELONG TO UNION 0.261* 
(0.015) 
 
0.308* 
(0.030) 
 
COHABITING 0.042* 
(0.018) 
 
0.035 
(0.035) 
 
AGE OF YOUNGEST 
CHILD 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
 
-0.007* 
(0.003) 
 
Constant -1.228* 
(0.039) 
 
-1.813* 
(0.078) 
 
Other Controls§ 
 
Yes Yes 
Sample size 37,678 
 
37,678 
Notes: Bracketed figures are standard errors and * denotes 5% significance. 
 
§  Other controls are education dummies (covering six levels of education from university 
degree-level to legal minimum years of schooling) and year dummies 
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Table 3  Probability of Job Separation and Working Paid Overtime: male 
workers (BHPS 1991-2005) 
Explanatory Variables 
All workers All workers excluding 
managers, professionals, 
and associate professionals  
WORKED PAID 
OVERTIME IN 
PREVIOUS YEAR 
 
-0.016 
(0.022) 
 
-0.067* 
(0.003) 
 
EXPERIENCE -0.028* 
(0.004) 
 
-0.028* 
(0.004) 
 
(EXPERIENCE)2/100 
 
 
0.008 
(0.007) 
 
0.008 
(0.009) 
 
BELONG TO UNION -0.305* 
(0.024) 
 
-0.415* 
(0.031) 
 
COHABITING 0.047 
(0.027) 
 
0.072* 
(0.035) 
 
AGE OF YOUNGEST 
CHILD 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
 
Other Controls§ 
 Yes Yes 
Sample size 
28,386 17,790 
Notes: Bracketed figures are standard errors and * denotes 5% 
significance. 
§  Other controls are education dummies (covering six levels of education 
from university degree-level to legal minimum years of schooling) and 
year dummies. 
 
 
 
 
 
